## From AI to Computational Social Choice


### Jérôme Lang CNRS & Université Paris-Dauphine PSL

#### IJCAI-22

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# Social choice theory

#### Designing and analysing methods for collective decision making



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## Social choice theory

### Designing and analysing methods for collective decision making

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A restaurant for tonight						
Find a restaurant for tinight	S voters have participated in this poll.					
		🖍 Vote	<b>.lı</b> Re	sults		

		japanese	indian	tunisian	pizza	crêperie
× × .	Bob	0	0		+	+
× × -	Carol	+	+		-	•
× × .	David	-	0	0	+	0
× × -	Edith	+	+		-	0
× × .	Ann		++	+		

The poll is opened until March 25, 2025 (unless the poll creator decides to close it before).



## Social choice theory

### Designing and analysing methods for collective decision making



A very rough history of social choice

- 1. around 1789: Condorcet and Borda (IJCAI-1789, Bastille)
- 1951: birth of social choice theory (economics/mathematics); mostly axiomatic results such as impossibility theorems (most celebrated: Arrow's)
- 3. from the 1990's: computational turn.

Edith Elkind's IJCAI-21 talk:

https://ijcai-21.org/videos-slides/?video=InvT1

# Social Choice Rules

- input: agents express preferences over alternatives/candidates
- output: an alternative

Choose the temperature in the room? Various input formats

Ann:	17	Ann:	$17 \succ 18 \succ 19 \succ 20$
Bob:	20	Bob:	$20 \succ 19 \succ 18 \succ 17$
Carol:	19	Carol:	$19 \succ 20 \succ 18 \succ 17$
David:	17	David:	$17 \succ 18 \succ 19 \succ 20$
uninominal			ordinal

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	17	18	19	20		17	18	19	20
Ann	+	+	+		Ann Bob	50	30	20	0
Bob				+	Bob	0	0	0	100
Carol		+	+	+	Carol	0	40	50	10
David	+	+			David	40	30	20	10
	арр	rovals	5			eval	uatio	ns	

## AI and Computational Social Choice

AI / CS have contributed to reshape social choice:

- new techniques
- new paradigms
- new objects of study, new applications

This talk: a quick guided tour of computational social choice via a **non-exhaustive, biased** selection of problems.

### WARNING: My slides contain no references.

Key references are on supplementary slides, and also on a text that comes with it.

- Representative democracy: citizens choose their delegates.
- Liquid/fluid democracy: citizens can choose either to vote on an issue, or to delegate to someone else.
- Direct democracy: citizens express their opinion on any issue.

Committee election

Who should be elected at the new steering board?

Do you want to vote yourself or delegate your vote to a trusted peer? Classical social choice Aggregating *preferences* No ground truth

### English idioms

You will be given English idioms, and asked to identify their meaning.

Do you want to vote yourself or delegate your vote to a trusted peer?

#### Landmarks

You wil be shown pictures of landmarks, and asked to say in which country they are.

Do you want to vote yourself or delegate your vote to a trusted peer?

Epistemic social choice: Aggregating beliefs about a ground truth





don't delegate

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### English idioms


You will be given English idioms, and asked to identify their meaning. Do you want to vote yourself or delegate your vote to a trusted peer?





Cycles? Delegations leading nowhere?

 $\rightarrow$  Ranked delegations



Thanks: Manon Revel, Markus Brill, Théo Delemazure, Umberto Grandi

### Epistemic social choice:

- there is a ground truth to be uncovered
- votes are noisy reports
- voting rules are maximum likelihood estimators.

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- starts with Condorcet's jury theorem, 1785
- $\rightarrow$  Statistical machine learning



#### Crowdsourcing via approval voting

In which of the 20 districts of Paris was this picture taken? You may give several answers. You will get a reward if your selection contains the true answer, minus a penalty that increases with the size of your selection.

#### Crowdsourcing via approval voting

	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	expertise?
Ann							+			
Bob			+		+			+	+	
Carol		+		+		+		+		
David							+		+	
Eva			+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Fred	+									
Gloria					+		+	+	+	
#	2	2	2	2	3	2	4	4	4	

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#### Crowdsourcing via approval voting

	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	expertise?
Ann							+			high
Bob			+		+			+	+	med–
Carol		+		+		+		+		med–
David							+		+	med+
Eva			+	+	+	+	+	+	+	low
Fred	+									low!
Gloria					+		+	+	+	med-
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Epistemic voting can also be applied to aggregating linguistic annotations Plurality voting: the candidate named by the largest number of voters wins.

4 voters	$a \succ b \succ c \succ d \succ e$
3 voters	$e \succ d \succ b \succ c \succ a$
2 voters	$c \succ e \succ b \succ a \succ d$
2 voters	$b \succ c \succ d \succ a \succ e$

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Plurality voting: the candidate named by the largest number of voters wins.

4 voters  $a \succ b \succ c \succ d \succ e$ 3 voters  $e \succ d \succ b \succ c \succ a$ 2 voters  $c \succ e \succ b \succ a \succ d$ 2 voters  $b \succ c \succ d \succ a \succ e$ winner: a

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Plurality voting: the candidate named by the largest number of voters wins.

4 voters  $a \succ b \succ c \succ d \succ e$ 3 voters  $e \succ d \succ b \succ c \succ a$ 2 voters  $c \succ e \succ b \succ a \succ d$ 2 voters  $b \succ c \succ d \succ a \succ e$ previous winner: a

winner: e

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Plurality voting: the candidate named by the largest number of voters wins.

4 voters  $a \succ b \succ c \succ d \succ e$ 3 voters  $e \succ d \succ b \succ c \succ a$ 2 voters  $c \succ e \succ b \succ a \succ d$ 2 voters  $b \succ c \succ d \Rightarrow a \leftarrow e$ previous winner: ewinner: b

Chances are that we have reached convergence.

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### 4 voters $a \succ b \succ c \succ d \succ e$ $a \succ b \succ c \succ d \succ e$ 3 voters $e \succ d \succ b \succ c \succ a$ $e \succ d \succ b \succ c \succ a$ 2 voters $c \succ e \succ b \succ a \succ d$ $c \succ e \succ b \succ a \succ d$ 2 voters $b \succ c \succ d \succ a \succ e$ $b \succ c \succ d \succ a \succ e$ winner a b

▶ voting rule + voter behaviour model → equilibrium reached?


equilibria sometimes of better quality than sincere outcomes

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Thanks: Reshef Meir

## 4. Distortion and low-communication voting Metric setting

- alternatives and voters are in a metric space with distance d
- ▶ cost (or disutility) of alternative x to voter i:  $c_i(x) = d(i, x)$
- f voting rule with ordinal input?
- distortion of f: worst-case ratio between the cost of the winner according to f, and the optimal cost.



- a has a global cost  $\sim 3n/4$  ... and is the majority winner
- *b* has a global cost  $\sim$  n/4
- when n = 2, all reasonable voting rules with ordinal input degenerate to majority

- no voting rule with can have distortion smaller than 3 !
- can we find a rule that achieves 3?

Metric setting



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### Metric setting



References: supplementary slides + paper!

### Metric setting

References: supplementary slides + paper!

### Metric setting



4.23 variant of Copeland (2019)

## 3 - a complex rule (2020)

+ a very simple rule: IJCAI-2022, Friday 10am needs voters to submit only 2 log *m* bits each low-communication voting rule

References: supplementary slides + paper!

## 5. Complex alternatives $\rightarrow$ Combinatorial domains

- there are several possible topics I can speak during my talk
- I have time to talk only about two topics
- Ann: would like to hear about  $t_1$  or  $t_3$ , and about  $t_2$  or  $t_4$ .
- Bob: likes  $t_1$  and  $t_4$ , and in case  $t_1$  is not selected then  $t_2$ .
- ▶ Carol: likes *t*<sub>3</sub> and that's all.
- focus on preferential dependencies
- use compact preference representation languages, e.g. CP-nets

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We can now select three topics. The votes of the attendees:

	$t_1$	$t_2$	t <sub>3</sub>	t <sub>4</sub>	$t_5$
8 voters	+	+	+		
3 voters				+	
1 voter					+

Three possible criteria  $\rightarrow$  three families of rules

excellence	$t_1, t_2, t_3$
diversity	$t_1, t_3, t_4$
proportionality	$t_1, t_2, t_5$

We can now select three topics. The votes of the attendees:

Three possible criteria  $\rightarrow$  three families of rules

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8 voters	+	+	+		
3 voters				+	
1 voter					+

Three possible criteria  $\rightarrow$  three families of rules

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diversity	$t_1, t_3, t_4$
proportionality	$t_1, t_2, t_5$

We can now select three topics. The votes of the attendees:

	$t_1$	<i>t</i> <sub>2</sub>	t <sub>3</sub>	t4	$t_5$
8 voters	+	+	+		
3 voters				+	
1 voter					+

Three possible criteria  $\rightarrow$  three families of rules

excellence	$t_1, t_2, t_3$
diversity	$t_1, t_3, t_4$
proportionality	$t_1, t_2, t_5$

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focus on properties, especially proportionality

- topics now have durations
- total budget: 30 minutes

	$t_1$	$t_2$	t <sub>3</sub>	t4	t <sub>5</sub>	t <sub>6</sub>
$100 \times$	+	+				
90  imes			+			
$30 \times$				+	+	+
$30 \times$				+	+	
10  imes	+			+		
cost	9	9	9	4	4	4

- topics now have durations
- total budget: 30 minutes

	$t_1$	$t_2$	t <sub>3</sub>	t4	$t_5$	t <sub>6</sub>
100× 90×	+	+				
			+			
$30 \times$				+	+	+
$30 \times$				+	+	
10  imes	+			+		
cost	9	9	9	4	4	4

A more common interpretation:

- $t_1, \ldots, t_6$  are projects with costs
- ▶ total budget: 30 M€

The greedy method

	$t_1$	t <sub>2</sub>	t <sub>3</sub>	t <sub>4</sub>	$t_5$	t <sub>6</sub>	topic #votes cost
$100 \times$	+	+					$\frac{t_1}{t_1} \frac{110}{9} \bullet$
90 imes $30 imes$			+	1	1	ī	t <sub>2</sub> 100 9 •
30×				+	+	+	t <sub>3</sub> 90 9 •
10×	+			+	I		$t_4$ 70 4
cost	9	9	9	4	4	4	t <sub>5</sub> 60 4 t <sub>6</sub> 30 4
				o+. 3	20		t <sub>6</sub> 30 4

available budget: 30

Good?

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	$t_1$	$t_2$	t <sub>3</sub>	$t_4$	$t_5$	t <sub>6</sub>						
$100 \times$	+	+					to	pic	<i>#votes</i>	cost		
90  imes			+					t <sub>1</sub>	110	9	•	•
30  imes				+	+	+	i	$t_2$	100	9	•	
30  imes				+	+		i	t3	90	9	•	•
10  imes	+			+			i	$t_4$	70	4		•
cost	9	9	9	4	4	4	1	t5	60	4		•
av	ailat	ole b	oudg	et: 3	30		i	t <sub>6</sub>	30			•

Need to ensure fairness to groups of voters through proportionality

## 5. Complex alternatives $\rightarrow$ Judgment aggregation

We can select three topics. The votes of the attendees:

	$t_1$	$t_2$	t <sub>3</sub>	$t_4$	$t_5$
5 voters	+	+	+		
3 voters	+	+			+
1 voter				+	+
1 voter			+		+
2 voters				+	

Admissible committees are those that satisfy the constraint

 $(t_1 \lor t_3) \land (t_2 \lor t_5) \land \neg (t_1 \land t_4 \land t_5) \land \neg (t_2 \land t_4 \land t_5) \land (t_3 
ightarrow t_4)$ 

focus on complex feasibility constraints

## 5. Complex alternatives

focus on	proportionality	complex	complex
locus on	guarantees	preferences	constraints
combinatorial		1	
domains		+	
multiwinner	1		
elections	+		
participatory	1		
budgeting	+		(+)
judgment			
aggregation			

Thanks: Dominik Peters

- select 4 members for a committee
- ideal representation objectives
  - ▶ 50% male, 50% female
  - 25% area 1, 50 % area 2, 25 % area 3.
  - ▶ 25% junior, 75 % senior.

	Gender	Area	Seniority	
<i>c</i> <sub>1</sub>	F	1	J	
<i>c</i> <sub>2</sub>	М	3	5	
<i>C</i> 3	F	1	S	
C3 C4 C5	М	2	J	
<i>C</i> 5	М	2	J	
<i>c</i> <sub>6</sub>	М	2	J	
C7	F	2	J	
<i>C</i> 8	М	3	S	

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- select 4 members for a committee
- ideal representation objectives
  - ► 50% male, 50% female
  - $\blacktriangleright~25\%$  area 1, 50 % area 2, 25 % area 3.  $\checkmark~$
  - 25% junior, 75 % senior.

× (50 / 50)

	Gender	Area	Seniority	
<i>c</i> <sub>1</sub>	F	1	J	
<i>c</i> <sub>2</sub>	М	3	S	
<i>C</i> 3	F	1	5	
<i>C</i> 4	М	2	J	
<i>C</i> 5	М	2	J	
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7	М	2	J	
<b>C</b> 7	F	2	J	
<i>c</i> <sub>8</sub>	М	3	S	

- select 4 members for a committee
- constraints:
  - ▶ 50% male, 50% female
  - ▶ 25%-50 % area 1, 40%-60 % area 2, 10%-25 % area 3.
  - $\blacktriangleright~\geq$  25% junior,  $\geq$  50 % senior.

	Gender	Area	Seniority	
<i>c</i> <sub>1</sub>	F	1	J	
<i>c</i> <sub>2</sub>	М	2	J	
<i>c</i> <sub>3</sub>	М	2	5	
C <sub>2</sub> C <sub>3</sub> C <sub>4</sub> C <sub>5</sub> C <sub>6</sub> C <sub>7</sub>	F	3	5	
<i>C</i> 5	М	2	J	
<i>c</i> <sub>6</sub>	М	2	J	
C7	М	2	J	
<i>C</i> 8	F	1	J	

Which committee should be elected?

- select 4 members for a committee
- votes
- hard constraints:
  - ▶ 50% male, 50% female
  - ▶ 25%-50 % area 1, 40%-60 % area 2, 10%-25 % area 3.
  - $\blacktriangleright~\geq$  25% junior,  $\geq$  50 % senior.

	Gender	Area	Seniority	$ v_1 $	<i>v</i> <sub>2</sub>	V <sub>3</sub>	<i>V</i> 4	$V_5$	$V_6$	<i>V</i> 7
<i>c</i> <sub>1</sub>	F	1	J	+				+		+
<i>c</i> <sub>2</sub>	М	3	S	+						+
<i>c</i> <sub>3</sub>	F	1	S	+	+		+			
<i>C</i> 4	М	2	J				+			
<i>C</i> 5	М	2	J		+		+			
<i>c</i> <sub>6</sub>	М	2	J						+	+
C7	F	2	J			+	+			
<i>c</i> <sub>8</sub>	М	3	S			+		+		

Which committee should be elected?

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- variant with randomized, fair selection
- variant with online selection

- variant with randomized, fair selection
- variant with online selection
- ▶ 50% male, 50% female
- 25% area 1, 50 % area 2, 25 % area 3.
- 25% junior, 75 % senior.

Gender	Area	Seniority	select?
М	3	J	yes

- variant with randomized, fair selection
- variant with online selection
- ▶ 50% male, 50% female
- 25% area 1, 50 % area 2, 25 % area 3.
- 25% junior, 75 % senior.

Gender	Area	Seniority	select?
М	3	J	yes
F	3	J	no

- variant with randomized, fair selection
- variant with online selection
- ▶ 50% male, 50% female
- 25% area 1, 50 % area 2, 25 % area 3.
- 25% junior, 75 % senior.

Gender	Area	Seniority	select?
М	3	J	yes
F	3	J	no
М	1	S	yes

► if the probability distribution on arrivals is known → Markov decision processes

• if not  $\rightarrow$  reinforcement learning

	а	b	с	d	е
Ann	15	3	2	2	6
Bob	7	5	5	5	7
Carol	20	3	3	3	3

- $v_{Bob}(b) = 5 =$  value of item b for Bob
- Assume agents have additive valuations:

$$v_{Bob}(\{b, e\}) = 5 + 7 = 12$$

- envy-freeness (EF): every agent i weakly prefers her share to the share of any other agent j
- ► Ann prefers Bob's share {b, e} to her own {c, d}: the blue allocation is not envy-free
- There in no envy-free allocation!

	а	b	с	d	е
Ann	15	3	2	2	6
Bob	7	5	5	5	7
Carol	20	3	3	3	3

- A weakening of EF: envy-freeness up to one good (EF1):
- The blue allocation is EF1:
  - Ann no longer envies Bob if we remove one good from Bob's share: v<sub>Ann</sub>({b, e} \ {e}) = 3 ≤ v<sub>Ann</sub>({c, d}) = 4
  - Ann no longer envies Carol if we remove one good from Carol's share: v<sub>Ann</sub>({a} \ {a}) = 0 ≤ v<sub>Ann</sub>({c, d}) = 4

- Bob and Carol do not envy anyone.
- An EF1 allocation is guaranteed to exist (for additive valuations) and can be computed in polynomial time.

	а	b	С	d	е
Ann	15	3	2	2	6
Bob	7	5	5	5	7
Carol	20	3	3	3	3

Between EF1 and EF: envy-freeness up to any good (EFX)

- Ann still envies Bob if we remove b from Bob's share: v<sub>Ann</sub>({b, e} \ {b}) = 6 > v<sub>Ann</sub>({c, d}) = 4
- the blue allocation is not EFX.

	а	b	с	d	е
Ann	15	3	2	2	6
Bob	7	5	5	5	7
Carol	20	3	3	3	3

- Between EF1 and EF: envy-freeness up to any good (EFX)
- the red allocation is EFX: removing any good from Bob's share eliminates Ann her envy towards Bob; and similarly for her envy to Carol.

	а	b	с	d	е
Ann	15	3	2	2	6
Bob	7	5	5	5	7
Carol	20	3	3	3	3

Between EF1 and EF: envy-freeness up to any good (EFX)


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- the red allocation is EFX
- does an EFX allocation always exist?

					d	е
An	n   1	.5	3	2	2	6
Bo	n 1 ob rol <mark>2</mark>	7	5	5	5	7
~			~	~	~	2

- Between EF1 and EF: envy-freeness up to any good (EFX)
- the red allocation is EFX
- does an EFX allocation always exist? Long-standing open problem





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## 8. Automated Theorem Proving for Social Choice

- proving (or disproving) theorems in social choice is difficult because it involves large combinatorial structures
- SAT solvers can help!
- find new proofs for known results; discover new results; uncover mistakes in the literature

### Example: two sided matching

- two groups of n agents each
- each agent ranks the agents of the other group
- can we guarantee stability and fair treatment of both groups?
- ▶ no as soon as n ≥ 3!

Stability for n = 3: conjunction of 419,904 clauses

 $\bigwedge \qquad \bigwedge \qquad \bigwedge \qquad \bigwedge \qquad \bigwedge \qquad \bigwedge \qquad \neg x_{p \rhd (i,j')} \lor \neg x_{p \rhd (i',j)}$  $p \in R_3!^3 \times L_3!^3 i \in 1, 2, 3 j \in 1, 2, 3 i' : l_i \succ_{r_i} l_{j'} \in p j' : r_j \succ_{l_i} r_{j'} \in p$ 

Thanks: Ulle Endriss

## 9. Collective decision making datasets

### Building & maintaining

Dataset for voting data: PREFLIB.ORG

Other datasets: matching, participatory budgeting

all open access

### Exploiting

Gap between theory and real-world instances?

Assessing the validity of preference models

Learning/ discovering structure


# 9. Collective decision making datasets

### Building & maintaining

Dataset for voting data: PREFLIB.ORG

Other datasets: matching, participatory budgeting

all open access



### Exploiting

Gap between theory and real-world instances?

Assessing the validity of preference models

Learning/ discovering structure

"Map of real-world elections"

Source: Boehmer, Bredereck, Faliszeswski, Niedermeier & Szufa, 2021

# Social choice engineering at Université Paris-Dauphine



- huge construction works in the whole building 2022-2027
- one building, 600 offices, most occupied by one or two persons
- ▶ > 90% of the building will be completely rebuilt
- ▶ 5 big phases, whose duration is known with some uncertainty
- it is known which offices will be unavailable at each phase
- initial office allocation known, final state (almost) known
- people moving in average twice + possible compression at some intermediate phase

Students: this should not prevent you from coming and studying with us!


## Social choice engineering at Université Paris-Dauphine


- the university asked us to help finding a fair and efficient reallocation sequence
- expertise needed in AI, OR and social choice
- ► a fair division problem? Yes but:
  - ▶ 6 research labs + teaching departments + central services ⇒ not clear who the agents are: individuals, groups, both?
  - heavily non-additive preferences: desire for labs/departments to remain grouped, for moves to be timewise not too close, ...
  - uncertainty

temporal fair division problem with individual and group fairness, complex nonadditive preferences and uncertainty!

- each of these complications has been studied individually
- no known framework / algorithm for our problem
- social choice engineering! (here and elsewhere)

# Social Choice Engineering





Summary: Social Choice and AI

new techniques new paradigms new objects of study new applications

multiagent systems KR&R planning/MDP online learning statistical learning SAT

user modelling? NLP?

Special thanks: François Durand

General

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Informal paper and other resources coming with this talk:



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https://www.lamsade.dauphine.fr/~lang/IJCAI22.html